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This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later
construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who
want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons
emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about
abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal
description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety
of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools
can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications
from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in
economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of
complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,
static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.